INFANTRY ATTACKS

 Author : Erwin Rommel , 

Introduction by Manfred Rommel.

Summary

“An intimate insight into the mind of one of the 20th century’s great commanders, a superb technical narrative of First World War combat operations.” —Military History Monthly

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel exerted an almost hypnotic influence not only over his own troops but also over the Allied soldiers of the Eighth Army in the Second World War. Even when the legend surrounding his invincibility was overturned at El Alamein, the aura surrounding Rommel himself remained unsullied.

In this classic study of the art of war Rommel analyses the tactics that lay behind his success. First published in 1937 it quickly became a highly regarded military textbook, and also brought its author to the attention of Adolf Hitler. Rommel was to subsequently advance through the ranks to the high command in the Second World War. As a leader of a small unit in the First World War, he proved himself an aggressive and versatile commander, with a reputation for using the battleground terrain to his own advantage, for gathering intelligence, and for seeking out and exploiting enemy weaknesses. Rommel graphically describes his own achievements, and those of his units, in the swift...

概括

 “对 20 世纪一位伟大指挥官思想的深入洞察，对第一次世界大战作战行动的精湛技术叙述。” ——《军事历史月刊》

 第二次世界大战期间，埃尔温·隆美尔元帅不仅对自己的部队，而且对盟军第八集团军士兵都产生了近乎催眠般的影响。 即使关于他所向无敌的传说在阿拉曼被推翻，隆美尔本人的光环仍然没有受到玷污。

 在这部经典的战争艺术研究中，隆美尔分析了他成功背后的战术。 它于 1937 年首次出版，很快成为一本备受推崇的军事教科书，也引起了阿道夫·希特勒的注意。 隆美尔随后在第二次世界大战中晋升为高级指挥员。 作为第一次世界大战中一个小部队的领导者，他证明了自己是一位积极进取、多才多艺的指挥官，以利用战场地形为自己谋取优势、收集情报以及寻找和利用敌人的弱点而闻名。 隆美尔迅速生动地描述了他自己以及他的部队的成就……

Chapter List (67 chapters):

Chapter 1: Cover

Chapter 2: Title Page

Chapter 3: Copyright

Chapter 4: Contents

Chapter 5: Introduction to New Edition

Chapter 6: Publisher’s Note

Chapter 7: Foreword

Chapter 8: Part I: The War of Movement: Belgium and Northern France, 1914

Chapter 9: Chapter 1: Fighting at Bleid and Doulcon Woods

Chapter 10: I: The Beginning, 1914 - Ulm, July 31, 1914

Chapter 11: II: At the Frontier

Chapter 12: III: Reconnaissance in the Direction of Longwy and Preparations for the First Battle

Chapter 13: IV: The Battle of Bleid

Chapter 14: V: On the Meuse; Battles at Mont and in the Doulcon Woods

Chapter 15: Chapter 2: Battles at Gesnes, Defuy Woods and Rembercourt

Chapter 16: I: The Fight at Gesnes

Chapter 17: II: Pursuit Through the Argonne; The Fight at Pretz

Chapter 18: III: Attack on Defuy Woods

Chapter 19: IV: Battle at the Defuy Woods

Chapter 20: V: Night Attack from September 9-10, 1914

Chapter 21: Chapter 3: Fighting Near Montblainville

Chapter 22: I: Retirement Through the Argonne

Chapter 23: II: Engagement at Montblainville; Storming Bouzon Woods

Chapter 24: III: Forest Fighting Along the Roman Road

Chapter 25: Part II: Trench Warfare in the Argonne and High Vosges

Chapter 26: Chapter 4: Attack in the Charlotte Valley

Chapter 27: Chapter 5: Trench Fighting at “Central” and in the Charlotte Valley

Chapter 28: I: Trench Warfare in the Argonne

Chapter 29: II: Attack on Central

Chapter 30: III: Attack of September 8, 1915

Chapter 31: Chapter 6: Raids in the “Pinetree Knob” Sector, High Vosges

Chapter 32: I: The New Unit

Chapter 33: II: Raids in the “Pinetree Knob” Sector

Chapter 34: Part III: Open Warfare in Rumania and the Carpathians, 1917

Chapter 35: Chapter 7: From Skurduk Pass to Vidra

Chapter 36: I: Occupation of Hill 1794

Chapter 37: II: Attack on the Lesului

Chapter 38: III: Battle at Kurpenul - Valarii

Chapter 39: IV: Hill 1001, Magura Odobesti

Chapter 40: V: Gagesti

Chapter 41: VI: At Vidra

Chapter 42: Chapter 8: First Operations Against Mount Cosna

Chapter 43: I: Approach March to the Carpathian Front

Chapter 44: II: Attack against the Ridge Road Salient, August 9, 1917

Chapter 45: III: Attack of August 10, 1917

Chapter 46: IV: The Capture of Mount Cosna, August 11,1917

Chapter 47: V: Combat on August 12, 1917

Chapter 48: Chapter 9: Further Operations at Mount Cosna

Chapter 49: I: The Defense, August 14-18, 1917

Chapter 50: II: Second Attack on Mount cosna, August 19, 1917

Chapter 51: III: Again on the Defensive

Chapter 52: Chapter 10: The First Day of the Tomeein Offensive

Chapter 53: I: Approach March and Preparation for the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo

Chapter 54: II: The First Attack: Hevnik and Hill 1114

Chapter 55: Chapter 11: The Second Day of the Tolmein Offensive

Chapter 56: I: Surprise Breakthrough to the Kolovrat Position

Chapter 57: II: Attack against Kuk. The Barring Luico-Savogna Valley and Opening of the Luico Pass

Chapter 58: Chapter 12: The Third Day of the Tolmain Offensive

Chapter 59: I: The Assault on Mount Cragonza

Chapter 60: II: The Capture of Hill 1192 and the Mrzli Peak (1356) and the Attack on Mount Matajur

Chapter 61: Chapter 13: Pursuit Across the Tagliamento and Piave Rivers, October 26, 1917 - January 1, 1918

Chapter 62: I: Masseris - Campeglio - Torre River - Tagliamento River - Klautana Pass

Chapter 63: II: Pursuit to Cimolais

Chapter 64: III: Attack Against the Italian Postiions West of Cimolais

Chapter 65: IV: Pursuit Through Erto and Vajont Ravine

Chapter 66: V: The Fight at Longarone

Chapter 67: VI: Battles in the Vicinity of Mount Grappa

Introduction to New Edition

INTRODUCTION TO NEW EDITION

BY MANFRED ROMMEL

My father wrote Infantry Attacks Greift in the first half of the 1930s. It was intended as a textbook for the infantry and in it my father drew on his own experiences as an infantry officer during the First World War. Anyone who reads it will notice that my own future existence was repeatedly and seriously in danger, for my father only survived the battles he was in by sheer luck. Had he not done so, I would not have been born in 1928. My father, incidentally, said once that in order to become a hero one must above all survive. Later on, I found this same thought expressed in the works of Elias Canetti. (* Elias Canetti was a German-language writer, born in Ruse, Bulgaria to a Sephardic family. They moved to Manchester, England, but his father died in 1912, and his mother took her three sons back to continental Europe. They settled in Vienna. Canetti moved to England in 1938 after the Anschluss to escape Nazi persecution. He became a British citizen in 1952. He is known as a modernist novelist, playwright, memoirist, and nonfiction writer. He won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1981, "for writings marked by a broad outlook, a wealth of ideas and artistic power". He is noted for his nonfiction book Crowds and Power, among other works.

Born: July 25, 1905, Ruse, Bulgaria

Died: August 14, 1994, Zürich, Switzerland

Occupation: Novelist

Language: German

Nationality: Bulgarian, British

Alma mater: University of Vienna (PhD, 1929)

Notable awards: Nobel Prize in Literature, 1981)

MANFRED ROMMEL : From my early childhood, as soon as I began to be aware of the world around me, I knew my father was a hero. Everybody said so; nobody doubted it. That would not have been possible in any case, as my father had been awarded the highest and very rare Prussian order for valour le in the famous shape of a blue Maltese cross, and established by Frederick the Great. The French name for the award made many of my compatriots uneasy at a time when most Germans only dealt with their French neighbours over gunsights. I remember some building labourers who considered me, then aged four, to be the correct fount of knowledge on why my father’s medal had such a suspicious French name. Nevertheless, this order was regarded by people at that time with the same respect we would now accord the Nobel Prize. When my parents were out, I used to take my father’s medals out of the drawer, pin them on my chest and look at myself in the mirror: unquestionably a most impressive sight.

   At that time my father was living in Goslar, in the Hartz mountains, as commander of a Jägerbataillon (literally: hunter battalion), which during the Napoleonic Wars, had been in the service of the King of England in the conquest of Gibraltar. This battalion consisted mostly of descendants of foresters, who only respected a man if he was a hunter. So my father had no choice but to qualify as a hunter and to adorn his home with horns and antlers of the beasts he had shot. He removed all our ancestors’ portraits and used the wall space for his trophies. He would even have removed the pictures of my mother and myself and substituted trophies instead, had he not encountered strong opposition from the family.

   I have always been extremely fond of my father, because he was a warm-hearted person, because he devoted a great deal of time to me, because he even listened to me and declared me to be intelligent, and because he was an inventive and imaginative story-teller of both fact and fiction.

   In this book, however, nothing is fiction. Easily though it reads, it is the result of self-criticism. My father was a good mathematician, and as a mathematician he was used to doubting conceptions and views. He submitted his own actions to his critical judgement, and considered that only through self-criticism and continuous evaluation of experiences had he become a good tactician and qualified military leader. So, after the First World War, he devoted a great deal of time to critical study of the operations in which he had been involved and the battles in which he had commanded. He made enquiries of other officers and soldiers and carefully evaluated the information he received. With my mother, he even visited, on a motorbike, the part of Italy where he had stayed during the war, taking hundreds of photographs and making sketches. It goes without saying that my father did not indicate his profession on the passport he used for the trip as ‘military commander’ but as ‘engineer,’ in order to avoid any unpleasant memories for the Italians.

   During the Second World War, too, my father tried always to record his adventures and experiences on paper as soon as possible in order to find out what could have been done better. His writings were published after the war.

   My father was a professional soldier. In the German Reich prior to 1933, professional soldiers were not allowed either to become involved in politics or to vote. Therefore the soldiers considered themselves as apolitical and thereby not responsible for politics. This principle was a sound one and perfectly acceptable as long as there was democracy in Germany. But after Hitler had become Chancellor of the Reich in 1933 and had received a majority of two-thirds of the votes of the German Reichstag, this principle became fatal. In general, it is worth mentioning that all secondary virtues such as bravery, discipline, loyalty and perseverance only have validity so long as they are used in a good cause. When a positive cause becomes negative, these virtues become questionable. The German army had to experience this bitter truth during Hitler’s regime. Hitler’s attention was drawn to my father when he read Infanterie Greift. In 1938 he summoned my father and appointed him, in the event of army mobilisation, commander of the an administrative military post to which my father was little suited. However, Hitler respected him as a soldier, and in 1940 gave him command of a tank division which played an important role during the German offensive against Anglo-French troops that year. In 1941, my father was appointed German commander in North Africa. He stayed there, with some interruptions, until March 1943, when Hitler, as a result of my father’s pessimistic views on the future of the war so far as Germany was concerned, relieved him from his post.

   In spring 1944, my father became supreme commander of the German Army Group B in Northern France, Belgium and the Netherlands. After the Normandy landings, it became clearer by the day that the German troops were going to face an annihilating defeat. In this situation my father decided – if necessary on his own responsibility – to surrender in France when the Allied troops broke through. This he judged the appropriate moment taking into account the men under his command. He wanted to avoid, at all costs, the possibility that in the last phase of the catastrophe Germans might shoot Germans in his area of command. My father also had links with the conspirators in Berlin, but did not think they would be able to achieve a revolution or attempt an attack on Hitler himself. On 17 July, 1944, my father was severely wounded in Normandy during an attack by British low-flying aircraft. When Graf Stauffenberg, on 20 July tried to assassinate Hitler, my father was still unconscious. As is well known, Stauffenberg’s attempt failed. Hitler set in motion exhaustive investigations amongst the conspirators, and in the process it became known that my father had intended to turn against Hitler. Hitler, therefore, decided to exterminate my father, and this decision was implemented on 14 October, 1944. Two generals, charged by Hitler with this mission, delivered Hitler’s ‘offer’ to our house at Herrlingen near Ulm: that my father should agree to be poisoned. Provided he agreed, he was assured that the customary measures against his family – removal to a concentration camp – would not be taken. Nor would investigations be made about his staff officers. My father, who was convinced that Hitler would never put him on public trial, decided on death. He asked for the favour of ten minutes’ respite to say goodbye to my mother, myself and his staff officer. This he was granted. And so we knew how he had to die. Hitler arranged a state funeral for him, and at Hitler’s command the NS-Press celebrated my father once more as a war hero, so that those whom Hitler sent into the senseless battles of the last months of the war, could take him as their inspiration.

   I very much welcome this new edition of my father’s book, which after many years is now available once more for a new generation of those who study military conflict.

MANFRED ROMMEL

Oberbürgmeister

Stuttgart, 1990.

Publisher’s Note

General Field Marshall Erwin Rommel’s Infanterie Greift of which this is a translation, was published in Germany in 1937, and the first edition in English was published by The Infantry Journal in Washington in 1944. The original translator’s note explains that all German units and ranks have been converted into their American equivalents. Similarly all measurements except for the designation of heights have been converted from the metric system. The translator, Lieutenant-Colonel Gustave E. Kiddé of the Coast Artillery Corps, writing in 1943, points out that he was obliged to make his own decisions on some questionable points since ‘this translation was not prepared with the author’s sanction’!

   The associate editor of The Infantry Journal, Major H. A. de Weerd, contributed a foreword to their 1944 edition from which the remainder of this Note is taken. He points out that many such books were published in Germany after the First World War in an effort to find out why they had lost; at the time Rommel was an unknown lieutenant-colonel completing a tour of duty as instructor in infantry tactics at the Dresden Military Academy. Two years earlier he had written a small handbook for platoon and company leaders, Aufgaben für Zug und Kompanie (Problems for the Platoon and Company). Neither book made much impression at the time; they received only perfunctory reviews in German military periodicals and were barely mentioned in British or American military journals.

   ‘Five years later, writes Major de Weerd, ‘Rommel was directing the Afrika Korps with such success that, according to the Gallup Poll even the British, up until November 1942, considered him the “ablest commander produced by the war”. His repeated victories in desert operations against a succession of British commanders caused him to become the most publicized German general. His books, which up to 1941 had sold only a few thousand copies, went through many editions in Germany. … Most of the general tactical lessons taught by these combat narratives are valid today. The observations under which Rommel sums up his reactions to the various engagements are precisely the counsel an American officer would give his troops and junior officers under similar circumstances.

   ‘As a leader of a small unit in 1914–18, Rommel proved himself to be an aggressive and versatile commander. He had a highly developed capacity for utilizing terrain. His men were trained to take cover when possible in movement and dig in whenever they stopped. Rommel was tireless in reconnaissance and attributed many of his successes to the fact that he possessed better information about the enemy than they did about him. Information was shared with junior officers, noncoms, and even private soldiers. Into every battle plan and manoeuvre Rommel tried to introduce some element of deception and surprise. He sought out the weakest element in the enemy position and worked out a plan of attack to exploit that weakness and confuse the enemy as to his real intentions. He took pains to insure proper fire plans and used his machine guns and hand grenades in 1916–18 with the same skill that he used his 88s in 1941–42. Rommel was not afraid of changing plans or disobeying an order if he had better local information than his superior officer. He was also good at judging the moment when the cracking enemy should be attacked with every man at his disposal. If necessary he would order his men into the zone of a German barrage in order to give the enemy no rest in retreat. He bluffed Italians and lied to Rumanians in order to get them to surrender in 1917–18, just as he lied to his own troops in November 1941 (saying that Moscow had fallen) in order to get them to make a supreme effort against General Ritchie’s offensive.

   ‘The swiftness with which the Afrika Korps switched from armored attack to antitank defense showed that he remembered the lessons of 1914–18. He was constantly making personal reconnaissances in North Africa by station wagon, armored car, or Storch observation plane. His troops called him “the General of the Highway.” Instead of sharing his information before battle with subordinates as he did in 1915–18, Rommel broadcast in the clear his instructions and orders by radio in 1942, making use of a map reference called the “thrust line” which enabled him to direct tanks, planes, and motorized infantry amid the fluid conditions of battle. British radio listeners in Lybia often heard Rommel’s cool voice directing operations, although without knowing the “thrust line” on which his orders were based they could not understand what he meant or take counter action until too late.

   ‘In 1941–42, acting without air superiority, Rommel repeatedly destroyed British tank units larger than his own by striking them in detail. The Afrika Korps dug in its men and guns and set out its minefields, with astonishing swiftness. It prepared fire plans with great care. This enabled Rommel to lure the bulk of General Ritchie’s armor into a tank ambush at Knightsbridge Box on June 13, 1942, where he destroyed most of it.

   ‘For his victories at Knightsbridge and Tobruk in June 1942, he was awarded the rank of Field Marshal. Until his forward momentum was checked in July 1942 at El Alamein, it looked as if Rommel’s deception, speed, and striking power might be too much for the British in the Western Desert.

   ‘The arrival of General Montgomery changed all that. He made a new army out of the British Eighth Army by discipline and training. The arrival of new tanks, guns, and self-propelled weapons turned the scales well against the Germans. Rommel was decisively defeated at El Alamein, driven into a retreat which led across Egypt, Cyrenaica, Lybia, Tripoli, into southern Tunisia. Failing to prevent Montgomery from crossing the Mareth line in March-April 1943, Rommel was recalled to Germany for reasons of health. His successor, Colonel General von Arnim surrendered with the Afrika Korps in the Tunisian debacle of May 6–13, 1943.

   ‘When Italy collapsed in September 1943, Rommel was placed in command of the Italian and Balkan fronts. Early in 1944 Rommel was placed in charge of the anti-invasion forces in Western Europe. Despite repeated German references to his poor health, Rommel may again prove to be a resourceful and intrepid leader in battle. No commander can afford to take the slightest chance when fighting against Rommel, or offer him even the suggestion of an advantage. He is a tough and resourceful leader, but as General Montgomery has twice clearly proved, be outgeneraled and outfought.’

Foreword

FOREWORD

This book describes numerous World War I battles which I experienced as an Infantry officer. Remarks are appended to many descriptions in order to extract worthwhile lessons from the particular operation.

   The notes, made directly after combat, will show German youth capable of bearing arms, the unbounded spirit of self-sacrifice and courage with which the German soldier, especially the Infantryman, fought for Germany during the four-and-a-half-year war. The following examples are proof of the tremendous combat powers of the German infantry, even when faced with superior odds in men and equipment; and these sketches are again proof of the superiority of the junior German commander to his enemy counterpart.

   Finally, this book should make a contribution towards perpetuating those experiences of the bitter war years; experiences often gained at the cost of great deprivations and bitter sacrifice.

ERWIN ROMMEL

Lieutenant Colonel

1937

German Raiding Party in French Trenches, 1916.

Europe, 1914-1918

Map from Infanterie Greift an

a - The War of Movement: Belgium and Northern France, 1914.

b - Trench Warfare in the Argonne, 1915.

c - Raids in the High Vosges, 1916.

d - Open Warfare in Rumania, 1916-17.

e - Open Warfare in the Carpathians, 1917.

f - The Tolmein Offensive, 1917.

g - Pursuit Across the Tagliamento and Piave Rivers, October 1917 - January 1918.

I: THE WAR OF MOVEMENT: BELGIUM AND NORTHERN FRANCE, 1914

Chapter 1: Fighting at Bleid and Doulcon Woods

I: The Beginning, 1914 - Ulm, July 31, 1914

II: At the Frontier

III: Reconnaissance in the Direction of Longwy and Preparations for the First Battle

IV: The Battle of Bleid

V: On the Meuse; Battles at Mont and in the Doulcon Woods